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Mashups and Fair Use:
The Bold Misadventures of the Seussian Starship Enterprise
Peter S. Menell, ∗ Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ** and David Nimmer ***
This amicus brief filed in the Ninth Circuit appeal of Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. ComicMix
seeks to rectify and restore the balances underlying the Copyright Act of 1976—particularly the
interplay of the Section 106(2) right to prepare derivative works and the fair use doctrine. The
District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that OH THE
PLACES YOU’LL BOLDLY GO!—the defendants’ illustrated book combining Dr. Seuss’s OH THE
PLACES YOU’LL GO! and other Dr. Seuss books with Star Trek characters and themes—made fair
use of the Dr. Seuss works.
Based on the works at issue, uncontested facts, and the judge’s factual findings, the
amicus brief contends that defendants’ unauthorized derivative work plainly supported a grant of
summary judgment for the plaintiff on the fair use defense. The District Court’s conclusory
finding that the defendants’ work is “highly transformative,” disregard of the second and third
fair use factors, analysis of the fourth factor, and allocation of the burden of proof misapply the
standards for fair use analysis.
The District Court’s decision destabilizes essential copyright law principles that have
long supported markets for collaborations and derivative works. If this decision stands,
competitors could flood publishing, television, film, and merchandising markets with
unauthorized derivative works merely by “mashing” in other elements. Lucasfilm could produce
OH THE PLACES YODA’LL GO! without obtaining a license from Dr. Seuss Enterprises. The
developers of the Pokémon series could offer OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Pokémon GO!. Castle
Rock Entertainment could introduce OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Yada Yada Yada!. Warner Bros.
could freely mash together Bugs Bunny with Marvel Comic’s Iron Man or Sesame Street’s
Kermit the Frog. Moreover, anyone could produce and distribute such works. That result
contravenes what Congress intended in establishing an exclusive right to prepare derivative
works subject to the fair use defense.
While mashups can qualify for fair use in particular cases—for example, where they offer
parodic or even satirical commentary and insights; or where a fan adapts his or her favorite
characters or scenes for a school project—a categorical rule that commercial, non-parodic, nonsatirical mashups automatically qualify as “highly transformative” for purposes of fair use
analysis goes well beyond the Copyright Act’s regime for promoting expressive creativity.
Promoting mashup art beyond the limits set by copyright law’s exclusive rights, limiting
doctrines, and fair use analysis may well be a desirable policy reform for the digital age. Such a
course, however, is for Congress and not the judiciary.
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--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Copyright law’s fair use defense is one of the most vexing doctrines in all of
the law. From its emergence nearly two centuries ago through the present, courts
have struggled with and lamented its complexity, unpredictability, and subjectivity.
The reporters are replete with cases that could have gone either way.
This case, however, does not fall into the gray area. Based on the works at
issue, uncontested facts, and the judge’s factual findings, the defendants’
unauthorized derivative work plainly supported a grant of summary judgment for
the plaintiff on the fair use defense. Defendants produced OH THE PLACES YOU’LL
BOLDLY GO! [“BOLDLY”], a non-parodic mashup that combines Star Trek with Dr.
Seuss’s OH THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! [“GO!”]. BOLDLY’s slavish use of
imaginative graphic images and text from GO! results in a commercial work that
would, if marketed, directly compete with GO!’s graduation season book sales and
licensing marketplaces. The result does not qualify for the fair use defense.
The district court’s conclusory finding that the defendants’ work is “highly
transformative” and disregard of the second and third fair use factors misapply the
standards for fair use analysis. More troublingly, the court’s categorical
determination that “mashups” are inherently “highly transformative” for purposes
of fair use analysis improperly undermines the Copyright Act’s right to prepare
1
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derivative works and the proper role for the fair use defense. Moreover, the district
court’s shifting of the burden of proof regarding market harm to the copyright
owner contravenes basic tenets of civil procedure.
The District Court’s decision destabilizes essential copyright law principles
that have long supported markets for collaborations and derivative works. If this
decision stands, competitors could flood publishing, television, film, and
merchandising markets with unauthorized derivative works merely by “mashing”
in other elements. Lucasfilm could produce OH THE PLACES YODA’LL GO! without
obtaining a license from Dr. Seuss Enterprises [“DSE”]. The developers of the
Pokémon series could offer OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Pokémon GO!. Castle Rock
Entertainment could introduce OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Yada Yada Yada!. Warner
Bros. could freely mash together Bugs Bunny with Marvel Comic’s Iron Man or
Sesame Street’s Kermit the Frog.
Moreover, anyone could produce and distribute such works. The defendants
in this case did not license rights from the owners of the Star Trek series or DSE.
That result contravenes what Congress intended in establishing an exclusive right
to prepare derivative works subject to the fair use defense.
While mashups can qualify for fair use in particular cases—for example,
where they offer parodic or even satirical commentary and insights; or where a fan
adapts his or her favorite characters or scenes for a school project—a categorical
2
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rule that commercial, non-parodic, non-satirical mashups automatically qualify as
“highly transformative” for purposes of fair use analysis goes well beyond the
Copyright Act’s regime for promoting expressive creativity. Reversing the district
court’s decision, therefore, is critical to ensuring that the Copyright Act’s exclusive
rights, limiting principles, and policies, and the licensing institutions and norms
they have generated, continue to function effectively. By contrast, affirming the
district court’s decision would undermine Congress’s copyright protection
framework and threaten chaos in the content industries.
None of this is to suggest that the fair use doctrine is not an important
feature of copyright law or that individuals should not be able to express their
creativity or engage with influential works. It is essential, however, that the courts
not subvert the copyright system by holding that any mashup constitutes fair use.
The District Court’s decision is not merely a slippery slope undercutting the
statutory right to prepare derivative works; it is a precipice.
Promoting mashup art beyond the limits set by copyright law’s exclusive
rights, limiting doctrines, and fair use analysis may well be a desirable policy
reform for the digital age. Such a course, however, is for Congress and not the
judiciary.

3
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--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------ARGUMENT
As copyright scholars who seek to promote a balanced copyright system and
fidelity to legislative authority, we file this brief to rectify and restore the balances
underlying the Copyright Act of 1976. The factual background for this case is
presented clearly in the District Court’s rulings. After explaining the pertinent
statutory provisions (17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2), 107) and their interplay, we focus on
three principal errors made by the court below: (1) the conclusory determination
that BOLDLY is “highly transformative”; (2) flawed analysis of the fair use factors;
and (3) inappropriate shifting of the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on to
the copyright owner. The final section explores the larger licensing, institutional,
remedial, and policy aspects of this case.
I.

The Copyright Act of 1976

Since the nation’s founding, Congress and the courts have striven to promote
expressive creativity through the development of a robust and balanced copyright
system. This case involves the interplay of the § 106(2) right to prepare derivative
works and the § 107 fair use defense.
The District Court’s hasty rejection of the relevance of the § 106(2) right—by
blithely noting that copyright’s exclusive rights are subject to the fair use defense,
see DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d 1101, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2019)—overlooks
4
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important statutory context for understanding “transformativeness.” Congress
defines “derivative works” as works that “recast, transform[], or adapt[]” “preexisting works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). If, as the District Court ruled,
non-parodic, non-critical, conventional mashups are inherently “highly
transformative” under § 107 and such finding resolves all of the factors in the
defendant’s favor, then the right to prepare derivative works has no purchase for
any adaptation that combines pre-existing works. Congress did not intend such a
broad exemption. The resolution of this puzzle—and the dual meaning of
“transform”—lies in a deeper understanding of Sections 106(2) and 107.
A. Section 106(2): The Right to Prepare Derivative Works
Pursuant to Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress
granted authors exclusive rights to books and other creative works for limited
times. The 1790 Act granted authors of books, maps, and charts exclusive timelimited rights. See 1790 Act, § 1, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. A dozen years later
Congress recognized derivative work protection by extending copyright protection
to prints. See Act of 1802, § 3, Ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (imposing liability upon those
“copy or sell, or cause to be engraved, etched, copied or sold, in the whole or in
part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design, or shall print, reprint, or import for sale, or cause to be printed, re-printed, or imported for sale, any
such print or prints, or any parts thereof, without the consent of the proprietor or
5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436486

proprietors thereof” (emphasis added).
The extent of adaptation rights remained murky during the 19th century, with
some cases declining to find translations and creative abridgements to implicate the
right to copy. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853)
(No. 13,514) (concerning German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin). Congress
removed any doubt in the 1909 Act, granting authors the exclusive right to
“translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects or make any other
version thereof if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work;
to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model
or design for a work of art.” See 1909 Act, § 1(b), Pub. L. 349, 35 Stat. 1075.
Congress explicated the derivative work right in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Section 106(2) grants authors the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted work.” The Act defines a “derivative work” as “a work
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis
added).
Thus, a work that transforms a pre-existing work falls within the exclusive
6
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rights of the owner of copyright in the pre-existing work. Section 103(a) provides
that “protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright
subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.” See generally Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (finding that a script about Rocky Balboa fighting a Russian boxer
infringes the right to prepare derivative works). All of the § 106 rights are subject
to the § 107 defense.
B. The Fair Use Defense
Early court decisions recognized that “the question of piracy” often depends
upon a balance of factors, giving rise to the fair use doctrine. Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342, 344 (1841) (Story, J.). Courts evolved the fair use doctrine through
hundreds of published opinions over more than a century, ultimately leading
Congress to codify the fair use defense in the 1976 Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
7
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.1 In codifying this jurisprudence, Congress recognized the
judiciary’s ongoing role in developing the fair use doctrine. See Copyright Law
Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 66 (1976).
Drawing on Justice Story’s inquiry whether a new work merely “supersedes the
objects” of the original creation or instead adds something new, Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. at 348, Judge Pierre Leval introduced the term “transformativeness” to
elucidate fair use analysis:
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The use
must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner
or for a different purpose from the original. . . . [If] the secondary use adds
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights
and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)
(footnotes omitted, emphases added). He did not, however, view “[t]he existence of

1

Congress later applied fair use to newly enacted moral rights provision in §
106A, Pub. L. 101-650, 90 Stat. 2546, § 607 (1990), and added the following in
1992: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors,” Pub. L. 102–
492, Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3145.
8
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any identifiable transformative objective” as the end of the inquiry. Id. at 1111.
Judge Leval explained:
Courts must consider the question of fair use for each challenged passage
and not merely for the secondary work overall. . . . Simply to appraise the
overall character of the challenged work tells little about whether the various
quotations of the original author’s writings have a fair use purpose or merely
supersede. For example, in the recent cases of biographies of Igor
Stravinsky and J.D. Salinger, although each biography overall served a
useful, educational, and instructive purpose that tended to favor the
defendant, some quotations from the writings of Stravinsky and Salinger
were not justified by a strong transformative secondary objective. The
biographers took dazzling passages of the original writing because they
made good reading, not because such quotation was vital to demonstrate an
objective of the biographers. These were takings of protected expression
without sufficient transformative justification.
Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111-12 (footnotes omitted).
Drawing on Justice Story’s formulation, Judge Leval’s insights and terminology,
and Congress’s preambular examples, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit’s ruling denying the fair use defense to 2 Live Crew’s parodic version of
“Oh, Pretty Woman.” See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
The Court’s decision did not, however, hold that a finding that a work is
transformative runs the table of fair use factors. To the contrary, the Court noted
that even works with parodic elements could adversely affect the copyright owner’s
legitimate potential markets and such effects must be carefully analyzed. See id. at
593-94.

9
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C. Reconciling Section 106(2) and Fair Use Jurisprudence
As noted above, use of the term “transformative” in fair use jurisprudence
emerged long after passage of the 1976 Act. Neither Judge Leval nor Justice Souter
in Campbell expressly discussed the terminological overlap between § 101
(definition of “derivative work”) and fair use jurisprudence, but it is clear that they
did not intend for fair use to swallow a large portion of the right to prepare derivative
works. Absent constitutional violations, the judiciary cannot override Congress’s
express statutory framework. Thus, this terminology must be understood against the
backdrop of the Copyright Act. Judge Leval recognized that:
The transformative justification must overcome factors favoring the
copyright owner. A biographer or critic of a writer may contend that
unlimited quotation enriches the portrait or justifies the criticism. The
creator of a derivative work based on the original creation of another may
claim absolute entitlement because of the transformation. Nonetheless,
extensive takings may impinge on creative incentives. And the secondary
user's claim under the first factor is weakened to the extent that her takings
exceed the asserted justification. The justification will likely be outweighed
if the takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright owner.
Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111.
In discussing the fourth factor (effect on the potential market), often labeled the
most important consideration, Justice Souter recognized that although “[t]he market
for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would
in general develop or license others to develop,” which likely excludes critical
reviews or lampoons, works that comprise parody and other elements could
10
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nonetheless harm legitimate derivative licensing markets such as the general market
for rap music. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. “Evidence of substantial harm to
[such market] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of
derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals. See 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owner has rights to derivative works).” Campbell, 510
U.S. at 593. In that manner, the Supreme Court’s fair use analysis recognized the
continuing need to respect the copyright owner’s rights in derivatives.
Judge Leval has more recently clarified the meaning of transformative as applied
to § 106(2) and fair use analysis:
Transformations of the sort producing fair use are usually of a different
character from the transformations that produce derivatives. In the fair use
context, the word most frequently refers to the purpose of the copying—
ordinarily to communicate some kind of commentary about the original or
provide information about it. . . .
In the derivative context, by contrast, what Campbell refers to as the
‘critical bearing’ of the secondary work will generally be absent. The
transformation involved in making a derivative is usually one of form or
medium, offering the same work in a new version, form, medium, or shape,
rather than offering information or commentary about the original.
The classic understanding of derivatives is that they are works that
represent the original author’s creative expression in a different medium or
form to an audience that either is, or would be, motivated by appreciation of
the original author’s creative expression. . . .
See Pierre Leval, Campbell As Fair Use Blueprint, 90 WASH. L. REV. 597, 609-10
(2015) (footnote omitted). A few months ago, Judge Leval embroidered on those
considerations to explain that
11
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a common form of copying that is neither parodic nor satirical, where one
simply piggybacks on a famous song, poem or passage, or logo, playing on
public recognition of the original to give punch, or humor to a new,
unrelated message. Where the copying is essentially either to harness the
expressive brilliance of the original for the delivery of the copier’s message,
or to gain audience impact for the new message by free-riding on the fame
of the original expression, courts should ponder whether such changes can
qualify as transformative, whether they have arguable justification for
copying. It is difficult to see why the original author should not be entitled
to a fee for licensing such a utilization of her work.
Pierre Leval, Fair Use: A Ramble through the Bramble, NYU Proving IP
Symposium,

May

16,

2019,

video

available

at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGky_yG8dV8 (at 11:48 – 12:46).
II.

The District Court’s Errors

BOLDLY is less deserving of fair use than a work condemned by Judge Leval
which “simply piggybacks on a famous [work] playing on public recognition of the
original to give punch, or humor to a new, unrelated message.” Id. Here the
defendants did not even provide a “new, unrelated message.” Yet the District
Court collapsed the assessment of fair use by ruling that combining Star Trek
characters, settings, and themes with the vivid imagery and prose of Dr. Seuss’s
GO! (and other works) was “highly transformative.” This produced a domino
effect by which a conclusory judgment on transformativeness toppled the fair use
factors.
A. Evaluation of Transformativeness
While BOLDLY might well strike a lay observer as clever, engaging, and even
12
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transformative in a common parlance sense of the term, copyright’s fair use test
demands more than a simplistic test. As set forth in Part I, the inquiry focuses on
whether the defendant’s work serves a different privileged purpose than the
original work. The § 107 preamble identifies “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching[], scholarship, or research” as prototypical fair use purposes, none of
which remotely characterize BOLDLY. The District Court properly rejects the
defendants’ assertion that BOLDLY parodies GO!, but nonetheless concludes that
BOLDLY is transformative based on its allegedly different intrinsic purpose.
According to the District Court, whereas GO! functions as an illustrated book with
an uplifting message that would appeal to graduating high school and college
seniors, BOLDLY offers an uplifting message in an illustrated book (drawing on
GO!’S prose and imagery) “tailored to fans of Star Trek’s Original Series.” See
DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1115. The District Court then sidesteps the
more appropriate characterization: BOLDLY is a GO! sequel. See id. at 1116.
As the District Court correctly notes, derivative works can qualify for fair use.
But without a different privileged purpose such as a criticism or commentary, they
face a steep uphill climb. Even parodies have to survive the justificatory gantlet.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (observing that if the defendant’s work “has no
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the
alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid drudgery in working up
13
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something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of
its commerciality, looms larger”).
B. Consideration of the Fair Use Factors
Factor 1 (Purpose and Character of Use)
Section 107(1) asks courts to consider “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes.” Fair use jurisprudence emphasizes whether the defendant’s work merely
supersedes the objects of the original or “is productive and employ[s] the quoted
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.” See Leval,
103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111 (footnote omitted).
BOLDLY is an unabashedly commercial work that seeks to draw on GO!’s
popularity. It entertains and inspires its target audience in much the way as GO! It
parallels GO!’s creative style, imagery, and general purpose. By combining Star
Trek characters, themes, and space travel with GO!, BOLDLY only modestly adds new
insight and understanding.

Dr. Seuss’s imaginative imagery already reflects

alien/extra-terrestrial settings and characters. This factor favors the plaintiff.
Factor 2 (Nature of Copyrighted Work)
GO! is an imaginative, expressive, highly original work of graphic art and prose.
This factor favors the plaintiff.
14
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Factor 3 (Amount and Substantiality of Copying)
Drawing a questionable analogy to Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), a case distinguishable by the thinness of the copyright there
at issue, the District Court focuses its factor 3 analysis on one comparison: the covers
of the two works. See DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1118. The only image
at issue in Leibovitz was the magazine cover. The District Court properly determined
that the BOLDLY cover copies little from GO!’s cover. We would go further and
assert that BOLDLY’s cover likely does not even infringe GO!’s cover.

These observations, however, are entirely beside the point—one must not judge
a book by its cover. Insofar as the covers in this case are legally significant, they

15
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relate to the plaintiff’s trademark cause of action, not the copyright cause of action.
More importantly, as Judge Leval notes, “[c]ourts must consider the question of fair
use for each challenged passage [or image] and not merely for the secondary work
overall [or its cover].” Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111 (our bracketed text). The
following illustrations, not even analyzed by the District Court, demonstrate that
BOLDLY (on the right) slavishly copied highly original illustrations from GO! and
other Dr. Seuss works (on the left):

16
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BOLDLY essentially traces highly imaginative graphic images, color patterns, and
compilations of artistic elements. Such extensive copying cannot be justified by
parodic, critical, or other privileged justification.

The third factor favors the

plaintiff.
Factor 4 (Effect on Potential Market for Copyrighted Work)
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the defendant’s work on the
potential market(s) for the plaintiff’s work. This factor
requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market” for the original.
17
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NIMMER § 13.05[A] [4], p. 13–102.61 (footnote omitted); accord, Harper &
Row, 471 U.S., at 569, at 2235; Senate Report, p. 65; Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F.Cas., at 349. The enquiry “must take account not only of harm to the
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.” Harper &
Row, supra, 471 U.S. at 568.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
In many fair use cases, determining the potential market(s) for the plaintiff’s
work can be difficult. This is not such a case. GO! is a perennial bestseller during
high school and college graduation season. In addition, there is a robust market for
licensing Dr. Seuss works for collaborative books, audiovisual works, clothing, and
merchandise. The defendants and their business partners recognized that BOLDLY
would be a big hit during graduation season and could be exploited with posters,
mugs, and other merchandise.
Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that “Plaintiff has failed to sustain its
burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that BOLDLY is likely
substantially to harm the market for GO! or licensed derivatives of GO!.” DSE v.
ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1120. Even putting aside the District Court’s error in
imposing the burden of proof for the fourth fair use factor on the plaintiff, 2 the
District Court’s ruling makes no sense.

18
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Brick and mortar bookstores would undoubtedly stock BOLDLY in close
proximity to GO! during graduation season. Online search engines would quickly
recommend these books to graduation gift shoppers. It is not difficult to imagine
that searches for GO! would return recommendations for BOLDLY. Customers
interested in an entertaining aspirational book for their grandchild, nephew, or niece
would undoubtedly consider these books substitutes and choose the most
appropriate—perhaps Go! for the humanities or law graduate and BOLDLY for the
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) graduate. Unlike works that
target audiences outside the original work’s market—such as 2 Live Crew’s parodic
rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” or Alice Randall’s wrenching retelling of Gone
with the Wind from the standpoint of slaves on the Tara plantation, see Suntrust v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001)—BOLDLY would supplant
GO! sales.
Plaintiff also demonstrated that GO! and other Dr. Seuss works enjoy a robust
licensing market. The District Court’s decision serves as open invitation for anyone
to enter the market for Dr. Seuss mashups. BOLDLY usurps the opportunity for DSE
and the owners of the Star Trek series from pursuing collaboration. Cf. Anderson v.
Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
The District Court’s comparisons to Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), and Equals Three, LLC v. Jukin Media, Inc., 139
19
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F.Supp.3d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015), bear little relevance to the present case. Google’s
use of thumbnails of copyrighted images for purposes of its image search engine is
transformative in a functional manner that bears no relationship to the present case.
More directly, low resolution thumbnails do not compete with Perfect 10’s high
resolution images. To the contrary, Google’s image search engine might well drive
demand for Perfect 10’s photographs. Equals Three involved speculative potential
markets unlike those at issue here.
The fourth factor favors the plaintiff.
Balancing the Fair Use Factors
Contrary to the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants,
the fair use factors favor the plaintiff. BOLDY neither ridicules nor comments on
GO! nor uses GO! to poke fun at Star Trek. BOLDLY pays homage to both as it seeks
to commercialize a derivative work. While marketing a Star Trek themed version
of GO! for STEM graduates appears to be a promising marketing idea, it nonetheless
falls within plaintiff’s right to prepare derivative works. If merely combining GO!
with another work—such as Star Wars, Pokémon , and Seinfeld —qualified as a
transformative fair use, little would remain of the § 106(2) right. Fidelity to the
Copyright Act requires that courts apply the fair use doctrine with due regard for
copyright law’s right to prepare derivative works. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation
LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2014).

DSE has licensed authors and
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illustrators to publish several GO! derivative works. This case does not implicate
fundamental First Amendment concerns that would arise with critical commentary.
Hence, BOLDLY is better viewed as an unauthorized derivative work that falls outside
of the fair use defense.
III.

Licensing, Institutional, Remedial, and Policy Considerations

Notwithstanding the District Court’s flawed application of the fair use doctrine,
we would be disingenuous if we did not acknowledge our desire to experience the
adventures of a Seussian Starship Enterprise. The BOLDLY images and storyline
combine memorable, engaging, and inspiring childhood memories.
The Copyright Act offers multiple possibilities to launch that adventure. First,
Section 106(2) places the entitlement to pursue such a work squarely within the
authority of DSE and the owner of the Star Trek franchise. Those companies can
offer their own mashup of Dr. Seuss and the Starship Enterprise. This would be
analogous to Sylvester Stallone’s production of Rocky IV (arguably the best of the
Rocky sequels). See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).3
Second, DSE and the Star Trek franchise could join forces with the defendants

3

Stallone independently came up with the idea of Rocky fighting a Soviet
boxing powerhouse. See Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1161 (quoting Stallone
interview in WACO TRIBUNE HERALD, May 28, 1982; Section D, pg. 1; Anderson
did not prepare his treatment until June 1982).
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to pursue a collaboration. Much of the creative work has been done.
Unfortunately, the defendants may have poisoned the well by taking such a
cavalier approach to the projects. Nonetheless, the possibility still remains for
such a venture, subject perchance to an intergalactic peace treaty among the
parties.
Third, in appropriate cases (albeit not this one), derivative works could reach
the public through a non-injunctive remedy, such as a running royalty damages
award. The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388 (2006), provides that
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test . . .
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
Id. at 391. Judge Leval laments in his seminal pre-eBay article that
[o]ne of the most unfortunate tendencies in the law surrounding fair use is
the notion that rejection of a fair use defense necessarily implicates the grant
of an injunction. Many commentators have disparaged the overly automatic
tendency of courts to grant injunctive relief. The copyright statute and its
predecessors express no preference for injunctive relief. The 1976 Act states
only that a court “may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such
terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.” Moreover, the tendency toward the automatic injunction can
harm the interests of plaintiff copyright owners, as well as the interests of
the public and the secondary user. Courts may instinctively shy away from a
justified finding of infringement if they perceive an unjustified injunction as
the inevitable consequence.
22
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Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1130-31 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 1131-35; New
Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 663 n. 1, 664 (2d Cir.
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (advocating rehearing en banc and emphasizing the
importance of the public interest in determining the availability of an injunction).
Just as courts have fashioned a balanced framework for assessing fair use, the
eBay decision affords courts an opportunity to develop a further safety valve that
preserves incentives to create, balances compensation for authors, and promotes
dissemination of cumulative creativity. Such a doctrine has the additional virtue of
avoiding distortion of the fair use doctrine. See Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1131,
n. 114 (confessing with the benefit of hindsight that his “belief that the [Salinger
biography] should not be enjoined made [him] too disposed to find fair use where
some of the quotations had little fair use justification”); Peter S. Menell & Ben
Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CAL.
L. REV. 53, 80-81 (2014) (suggesting that a similar motivation might have been in
play in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006)).
Those general considerations should inform the crafting of copyright doctrine.
Nonetheless, there is little basis in this case to deny an injunction against continued
dissemination of BOLDLY. The harm to DSE appears serious and the blatant
unjustified infringement favors DSE. Furthermore, the publication of a mashup23

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436486

inspired sequel does not rise to same public importance as the dissemination of
vital historical information. See Jon O. Newman, Not the End of History: The
Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 12, 16
(1990).
Finally, Congress could reform the Copyright Act to ease the path for mashups.
Advances in digital technologies have unleashed a digital tsunami that continues to
reshape the content industries and the broader culture. While these technologies
have empowered creators and enabled them to reach vast audiences, they have also
introduced new challenges deserving of legislative attention. Cf. Peter S. Menell,
Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2016)
(advocating a compulsory license for music mashups). The present case highlights
the bargaining leverage and transaction cost challenges facing upstart creators
seeking to build on existing works. There are numerous ways in which Congress
could lubricate the wheels of progress. See, e.g., Menell & Depoorter, supra,
(proposing a novel mechanism that would afford a limited, cost-effective process
for preclearing works, promote fair negotiation over cumulative uses of
copyrighted works, and reduce the exposure of cumulative creators to the inherent
risks of relying on copyright’s de minimis and/or fair use doctrines.)
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CONCLUSIONS
The District Court’s determination that a slavish, non-parodic, conventional
mashup of a highly original illustrated book is “highly transformative” and
constitutes fair use fundamentally misapplies the standards for fair use analysis,
undermines the statutory right to prepare derivative works, and destabilizes
essential copyright law principles that have long supported markets for
collaborations and derivative works. The court should reverse the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment for the defendants and order entry of judgment for the
plaintiff.
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